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Introductory Remarks, Main Research Questions and Theoretical Framework
The last several years in the Balkans have brought series of protest waves. Contentious politics at its best. From Athens to Ljubljana, from Bucharest to Tirana, citizens raised their concerns against issues which have been contributing towards deterioration of their respective societies. The long and tiring process of economic and democratic transition, the large-scale violation of human rights, the unfair and illegal privatization of state property, as well as the staggering percentages of unemployment and poverty rates were just some of the reasons why people in Southeast Europe began to mobilize against government policies. One might lucidly highlight that finally, after more than two decades of strong apathy regarding political decisions and living conditions, empowered citizens started to contest the previously considered "ultimate powers" in society. Redundant working force, students, artists, university professors and a pallet of other societal groups, all together, took the streets sending a stronger message to the authorities that the long lasting status quo is no longer acceptable. The "Indignados" movement in Greece, the three protest waves in Bulgaria, followed by the plenumization in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are just few of the many examples pointing towards the awakening of the citizens' spirit in the region.
The main aim of this paper is to shed light on the causal mechanisms which drove forward two social movements, the "Bosnian Spring" from 2014 which took part in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "Citizens for Macedonia" movement which was active during mid-2015 in Macedonia, to influence/fail to influence particular policy outputs directly connected to claims previously articulated by the movements themselves. This task requires opening the "black box" of causality between a certain cause (a particular X), and a defined outcome (a particular Y), taking into consideration multiple causal factors (or variables, if we apply the "variable" language) which substantially influence the outcome.
One of the usual questions that every reader asks himself/herself is "Why did the author spend so much time to analyze this issue, why is this issue relevant?" We treat these issues to be scientifically relevant, primarily because literature on social movements in Southeast Europe, usually deals with the emergence and forms of mobilization, while the impact of social movements on political outcomes is largely neglected. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, there are no extant studies dedicated to social movement outcomes which focus on Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This creates fertile ground for delving deeper into these specific topics, unavailing certain aspects which still lay in the "realm of the undiscovered".
There are multiple ways to approach research in social movement studies. Still, extant theoretical and empirical studies are built around three main pillars: the resource mobilization theory (RMT); the discursive opportunity structure (DOS); and the political opportunity structure (POS). In our theoretical framework, we include all three pillars, trying to expand the theoretical approach by adding additional factors (variables) which are deemed relevant for the region which is at stake. We begin by introducing the concept of "shallow democracy", referring to processes leading towards failed democratization in the two countries. We treat shallow democracy as a background factor, as a tinder which triggered the protest movements both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The democratization process in the two countries under study, underwent a process of formal democratization which does not resemble the democratization processes which occurred in modern Western societies (Stefanovski 2016, p. 399) . Unlike what Donatella della Porta refers to as "democratization from below" (della Porta 2014), a process which occurred both during the bluster 1989 in countries from Eastern and Central Europe, but also during the 2014 "Arab Spring" in the Middle East, these two young, fragile and conflict-torn societies experienced a process of elite transformation. The elite transformation process can also be referred to as "democratization from above", as an antonym to the "democratization from below". This process was much more elite-driven, and citizens did not play a major role in societal change. Regarding East and Southeast Europe, theory recognizes two dominant types of consensuallyunified national elites: a "direct transformation", and a "transformation through a settlement of basic disputes among the elites" (Daskalovski 1999, p. 17) . Building on the theoretical arguments of Higley and Pakulski (1992) , Daskalovski defines direct transformation as an epilogue of party elites being able to acknowledge the counter-productivity of communist ideology, embrace democracy and create space for accommodation of new emerging elites (Daskalovski 1999, p. 19) . Conversely, the transformation through a settlement of basic disputes among the elites is recognized by the literature as a relatively rare and exceptional event when "national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements" (Burton and Higley 1987, p. 295) . It is fair to highlight that both Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent a process of direct elite transformation, where old communist party officials rebranded, and entered the field of multi-party democracy under new party labels, once again holding high public and party positions.
Departing from these reflections, in this study a differentiation can be made between deep and shallow democracy. As Ronald Meighan argues, "shallow democracy" refers to "limited power sharing and restricted participation in decision-making", which allows a very small space for participation by actors rather than those in power. Additionally, power structures can at any time arbitrarily limit or withdraw the amount of power being shared with different agents. (Meighan 2001, p. 297) . On the other hand, deep democracy provides a high level of power sharing, as well as possibilities for agenda setting by different actors. Moving a step further, deep democracy also refers to the levels of decision-making. In this case actors are not just simply involved in the agenda-setting, but they are also given the opportunity to personally decide upon the issues at stake (Ibid, p. 297).
On the side of the "dependent variables", or the outcomes, we distinguish between policy outputs and policy outcomes. A very useful definition of policy outputs dates from the late 50s of the previous century. David Easton defined policy outputs as the first formal materialization of a political process which later enables policies to be further developed; as political decisions formulated by the political institutions and the actors (Easton 1957) . Policy outputs are just one of the five levels of responsiveness to collective demands within a certain political system (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 230) . Nevertheless, when going deeper into analysis of policy outputs, one needs to have a better insight in all five levels. In his work "Policy Responsiveness to Protest Group Demands" Paul Schumaker distinguishes and thoroughly describes the five levels of political system responsiveness (Schumaker 1975, pp. 494-495) . The first level that the author explains is the "access responsiveness" defined as "the extent to which authorities are willing to hear the concerns" (Ibid, p. 494) of a specific protest group which is making particular claim(s). This concept of access responsiveness is deemed similar to Peter Eisinger's concept named "breaching the political opportunity structure" (Eisinger 1973, p. 17) . The second notion which Schumaker puts forward is the "agenda responsiveness" defined as an issue which is "placed on the agenda of the political system" (Schumaker 1975, p. 494) . The third concept which is subject to discussion in Schumaker's essay, refers to the process when the agenda of a certain claimant is formally transcribed into a legal act. This is the concept of "policy responsiveness" which, according to Schumaker, "indicates the degree to which those in the political system adopt legislation or policy congruent with the manifest demands of protest groups." (Ibid, p. 494) . Moving from the third to the last two levels of responsiveness, a crucial step forward is made in the sense of bridging the gap between "legalization" and "implementation". A potentially favorable policy responsiveness may easily end as a dead letter. This highlights the importance of the last two responsiveness levels. The fourth type of responsiveness is correlated to the ability of the authority to implement the previously enacted document. In many cases, due to various financial, political or simply logistical reasons, the formal framework cannot be effectuated in reality. When the responsible actors engage into effectuation, Schumaker labels this process as "output responsiveness" which indicates "the degree to which those in the political system implement policy-responsive actions" (Ibid, p. 495). The last level of responsiveness is closely tied to the de facto alleviation of the grievances initially addressed by the claimants. This concept is named "impact responsiveness" and it "indicates the degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in alleviating the grievances of protest groups" (Ibid, p. 495). These last two levels of Schumaker's framework refer to the policy outcomes, and not to the policy outputs.
The second part of the explanandum is devoted to policy outcomes. As Sabatier highlights, SMOs can succeed many times in getting their claims on the political agenda, even have their demands formally adopted, but effectuating the policy outputs "may require the development of legal and technical expertise and the capacity to monitor the activities of enforcement agencies" (Sabatier 1975) . In this work policy outcomes can be defined as direct effects deriving from the previously defined policy outputs which directly alleviate the grievances put forward by social movement actors (extensively regarding outcomes, in particular political outcomes see : Berkowitz 1974; Giugni 1998; Gurr 1980; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Tarrow 1993 , in Giugni et al, 1999 . The dominant strand in the literature of social movements, claims that unlike mobilization issues, creation of collective identities and the enhancement of capacities of SMOs and individuals, political outcomes are usually out of direct control of SMOs. The more dominant actors and factors which influence crucial political decisions leading to alleviation of challengers' conditions are usually legislators, administrators, political executives etc. (Amenta et al. 2010, p. 288 ). This will be clearly shown later in the two cases which are the focus of my research interest.
Moving to the "other side" of the theoretical framework, we will now elaborate on the independent variables (factors). We commence by presenting the cognitive aspects of the movements, or in a more specific context, the DOS. What usually keeps social movements together are same values, ideas and beliefs that movement participants share, but also the opportunities that movements are given (or they created themselves) to penetrate the public sphere. Putting forward certain claims is, to some extent, crucial for social movements. One of the most straight-forward definitions of claims-making is provided by Lasse Lindekilde who explains these actions as "the conscious articulation of political demands in the public sphere, thus leaving aside more private or hidden forms of political claims-making such as voting and lobbyism" (Lindekilde 2013, p. 201) . Furthermore, Koopmans and Statham speak about the public acts of claims-making as "the strategic demands made by collective actors within a specific contested issue field" (Koopmans and Statham 1999, p. 206 ) Taking a step forward, political claims-making, frequently associated with contentious politics, is well described by Charles Tilly. He speaks of contentious politics when "actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties" (Tilly 2008, p. 5) . The claims-making by social movement actors must be considered, primarily because the types and the varieties of claims can substantially affect the types of groups which are mobilized (see Snow et al. 1986 and Tarrow 1994) , as well as the number of challengers which are participating, something that might eventually have a strong impact on the outputs/outcomes of the social movements. The basic forms in which these political claims can be expressed as demands which are put forward, as well as the arenas where they can be presented are numerous. The forms can move from traditional protests and marches to media-dependent performances (Lindekilde 2013, p. 201) . Recent movements also witnessed very innovative and eventful forms of claims-making like dances, performances and individual acts, but also very tragic ones like self-immolations, reminding us of the Prague Spring and Jan Palach. An interesting example coming from the recent Gezi Park movement in Turkey is the one of Erdem Gündüz, also known as the "standing man" (duran adam in Turkish). On June 17th, Gündüz introduced a very innovative way of protest. He arrived at Taksim Square in Istanbul, and stood for eight consecutive hours, embracing a new way of civil disobedience (Sarfati 2015, p. 27) . The more tragic illustrations derive from the recent anti-monopoly protests in Bulgaria, when several people ignited themselves after falling into hopelessness and despair stemming from the economic downfall (Spiegel Online International 2013). Arenas for political claims-making can also vary from court rooms, via the streets, towards the most desired one -the media, as an arena through which both governments and public opinion can be best targeted (Lindekilde 2013, p. 201) .
A second explanatory factor that is considered in this paper, in order to explore the causal mechanisms which lead, or fail to lead, towards the creation of policy outputs and policy outcomes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia is the repertoires of contention, which is closely linked to claims-making. There are several crucial reasons why repertoires of contention are important for social movement outcomes. The number of movement participants affects the decision-making process, primarily because stakeholders in power always take into consideration electoral support. The main hypothesis regarding this issue is that large numbers can easily draw attention of decision-makers who fearing the possibility of losing the electoral support, might reconsider their political stances regarding issues which are being advocated by the movements (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 171) . Adding to this, we hypothesize that larger protest event participation increases the possibility of acquiring the desired policy output and eases the way towards a successful policy outcome. Furthermore, repertoires of contention almost always influence the actions of the authorities (DeNardo 1985) . The central hypothesis regarding the relationship between actions from social movement actors and authorities' actions is that larger crowds decrease the ability of the authorities to keep crowds under control. As della Porta highlights, "a repertoire of contention comprises what people know they can do when they want to oppose a public decision they consider unjust or threatening" (della Porta 2013, p. 1081). A modern repertoire of collective action is defined by Tilly as the "whole set of means [a group, della Porta and Diani, 2006] has for making claims of different types on different individuals" (Tilly 1986, p. 2) . Repertoires of action are very variant, the variance being determined mostly by temporalization (Tilly 1986 and Tarrow 2006) , but also by generations (Jasper 1997 and della Porta 2009). In his book focusing on public opinion and political parties in four Western European countries, Russel Dalton groups various forms of action taking into account the level of extremeness, classifying them in four categories: "The first threshold indicates the transition from conventional to unconventional politics. Signing petitions and participating in lawful demonstrations are unorthodox political activities but still within the bounds of accepted democratic norms. The second threshold represents the shift to direct action techniques, such as boycotts. A third level of political activities involves illegal, but nonviolent, acts. Unofficial strikes or a peaceful occupation of a building typify this step. Finally, a fourth threshold includes violent activities such as personal injury or physical damage" (Dalton 1988, p. 65) . Protests are among the most frequently spread contentious actions. Della Porta and Diani define protest as a "non-routinized action in which indirect channels of influence are opened through the activity of a series of collective actors" (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 191) . Although the two authors are questioning whether a protest can be labeled as unconventional due to its wide presence, still they conclude that it is not a "routinized form of participation in representative democracy" (Ibid, p. 191) . Another form of action which is very popular among protestors and which can show the strength of a movement are the petitions (Ibid, p. 172). In recent years, apart from the traditional way of petitioning, internet petitioning and campaigning has attained large popularity. There are many reasons why protestors opt for online petitioning: the fast and large spreading of the internet infrastructure, the easy accessibility, the saving of resources such as manpower, finances and time, as well as the outreach of the petition visualization of the movement and the claims it is making. The last form of action to be considered is violence. As della Porta and Diani stress, "violence is justified often as a symbolic refusal of an oppressive system, but it is also used, as in the anti-austerity riots, to win specific battles, or to obtain media attention" (Ibid, p. 174). A distinction must be made between violence which occurred as a reaction to prior state repression, and violence which was initiated by the movement participants primarily for gaining more attention and recognition by the wider public and the media.
The concept of POS has been operationalized in literature using several different indicators. Some authors refer to long duree aspects like the democratic history of the country (della Porta 2013, p. 957), others to more contingent and dynamic aspects of the contest, like the number of actors or the positioning of particular political parties (Kitschelt 1986, p. 63) , which might influence the mobilization of social movement actors favorably or unfavorably. In our theoretical framework we propose a closer insight on repression over social movements conducted by the state authorities, and analysis of the allies and opponents (the friends and foes) of social movements in the two respective countries.
The repression performed by state authorities is one of the key factors that might affect a particular social movement outcome, especially in societies which are not fully democratized, such as societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, which have less functional institutions and a relatively low level of political culture. This is the main reason why we start by introducing this particular component of the POS. Although there are various theoretical strands and empirical evidence regarding repression imposed by state institutions, which will be in detail elaborated in the following rows, in this case the driving hypothesis is that repression raises the costs of protest activities (Opp & Roehl, 1990 ) and should result with reduction of activism which leads towards limited influence over policy processes. Jennifer Earl defines repression of social movements as "attempts by individuals, groups or state actors (e.g. militaries, national police, and local police) to control, constrain, or prevent protest" (Earl 2013 (Earl , p. 1083 . This definition encompasses a wide pallet of actors. Contemporary studies include various forms of police action during protest events such as violence and brutality, kidnaping of activists, arrests and imprisonments, infiltration of informants within social movements, restrictions of basic human rights, as well as mis(use) of the internet (Ibid, p. 1083). For easier differentiation of repressive actions, scholars have categorized them as overt repressions (della Porta & Reiter 1998 and Earl, Soule & McCarthy 2003) and covert repressions (Marx 1974 and Cunningham 2004) . Another distinction has been made between coercive (Davenport 1995) and channeling (Oberschall 1973 and McCarthy, Britt & Wolfson 1991) repressive actions.
The last variable (explanatory factor) applied in the theoretical framework is the previously mentioned one dedicated to allies and opponents of social movements. We deem this explanatory factor to be one of the crucial for the selected cases mainly because of the high level of politicization and polarization of the society as a whole, which later creates numerous political, class, ethnic and confessional cleavages. Within this process, political parties tend to occupy every functioning cell of society, while influential media tacitly align, mostly, with political parties in power. Another very important issue regarding the outputs/outcomes of the movements in the region is the role of the international community. This outbreak is deeply enrooted in the recent history of the region because of the peacekeeping and reconciliation role which the international community was forced to play, with the primary role to maintain stability. The most convincing examples can be drawn from our case studies: both the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina which lasted for four years, as well as the armed conflict in Republic of Macedonia which followed in 2001, were concluded following a mediation driven by the international community. The allies and opponents of social movements are held in high regard, especially within the theoretical strands which lean more towards the political process approach. One of the central relations which should undoubtedly be taken into consideration is the relationship between social movements and political institutions. This connection is clearly explained by della Porta. She departs by defining the concept of POS as "characteristics of the external environment relevant to social movements" (della Porta 2013, p. 956). These characteristics vary thanks to both authors and contexts. Della Porta distinguishes between relatively more stable institutional structures and the changing configuration of power. Within the first group of important factors she includes the following: the strength of a government; the distribution of institutional power (especially the power of the central executive); the characteristics of the public bureaucracy and the powers of the judiciary; the overall amount of power in the hands of the state (this factor partially overlaps with the first two previously mentioned); the national political cultures; as well as the democratic history of a country. The latter group of more dynamic factors refers to dimensions which are prone to rapid short-term change, as well as the shift in the object of pressure from social movements. The initiators of this theoretical strand started with deeper examination of ad hoc openings (opportunities) in the system which would be beneficial for social movements. For example, Tarrow stressed electoral instability, elite divisions and availability of allies (Tarrow 1989) , and both Tarrow and Tilly highlighted the sudden variation in these opportunities (Tilly and Tarrow 2006) . Della Porta treats the following factors as crucial: the configuration of power with its two main structures -the alliance structure and the opposition structure; and the political parties, with emphasis on political cleavages and party divisions, the electoral competition, as well as the government/opposition positioning. The configuration of power, is defined by Kriesi as "the distribution of power among the various actors operating within the party or interest groups' system [which] affects the forms and results of the conflicts" (Kriesi 1989 ). This configuration of power has two main structures: the alliance structure which is created by the political actors that "provide resources and opportunities for challengers" (della Porta 2013, p. 957); the opposition structure formed by movement opponents which aim to reduce the resources and opportunities for challengers, conversely regarding the role of the allies (della Porta & Rucht 1995); and the political parties -as traditional allies with certain types of movements (Kriesi 1989) . The fluctuating relationship between social movements and parties depends on several important characteristics: The political cleavage and the party divisions within the party system; The electoral competition -in the sense that tendency to support protests has been correlated to electoral instability which highlights the importance of gaining more new votes (della Porta 2013, p. 958); and The government/opposition positioning, especially that on the Left as a traditional partner of social movements (Ibid, p. 958). Lastly, we would once again like to highlight a factor which is not very common for social movement studies, but, as we previously underlined, it is of utmost importance for the two cases which are analyzed, and that is the role of the international community. Both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia, the international community plays a vital role and largely shapes the political environment. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative is the ultimate legal authority who can abolish every existing legal act. Its position stems directly from the Dayton Agreement which defines this institution as the "final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement." (GFAPBH 1995, Annex 10, Article V). In Macedonia, societal and political conflicts have been traditionally mediated by representatives of the international community. This is the main reason why we hypothesize that any involvement on behalf of the international community acting as an ally or as an opponent, can seriously influence movement outcomes.
Below you can find the graphical representation of the theoretical model which was developed by the author for the purpose of his doctoral thesis research:
Case Selection, Data Collection and Methodology
The two cases which are in the spotlight of this research paper, the social movements in Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been selected both on their variance regarding important factors, as well as the great number of similarities, resulting with a combination of the most similar systems design (MSSD). A great number of similarities can be found in the context and the background of the cases. The two selected cases are geographically and temporally similar: they are located in the region of Southeast Europe and they occurred within a time span of two years. Additionally, both countries were a part of the Yugoslav Federation and, both experienced military conflicts, although the one in Bosnia being by far more catastrophic. Another important similarity is the multiethnic and multiconfessional character of the two societies.
Starting with the background factor "Lack of Democratization/Shallow Democracy", the cases share a large number of similarities: the rocketing level of unemployment, especially within the younger population which in 2014 reached staggering 57.5% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 50.8% in the Republic of Macedonia (World Bank 2014); the process of failed privatization of societal goods, leading to mass impoverishing of the citizens and creating "transition elites"; as well as the alarming level of corruption which deteriorated the two countries.
Moving to the side of the explanatory factors (the independent variables), the two cases are very similar regarding the "Claims-making process" and the "Repertoires of actions" which are relatively repetitive. Although the Macedonian movement focuses more on issues tightly connected to rule of law and protection of basic human rights, while the movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina based its mobilization on socio-economic issues, after the first couple of days of protest, both movements adopted the anti-governmental master frame, seeking for resignation of their respective governments as a central claim of the movements. The "Repression of social movement actors by state institutions" varies between the cases in the sense that movement actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina were dominantly exposed to overt state repression, while the challengers in Macedonia were mainly facing covert state repression. What refers to the "Allies/Opponents" explanatory factor, variance can be spotted meaning that the movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina mainly had to confront a large number of opponents, having almost none of the relevant stakeholders as allies. On the other hand, the movement in Macedonia had a significant number of both relevant allies and opponents.
Initial results point to variance in the explanandum regarding the "Policy outputs". This inevitably initiates variation regarding the "Policy outcomes" as well. With reference to the "Policy outputs", in the case of the Macedonian movement, clear policy outputs are present, while the movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to produce policy outputs on federal level, being limited to only a few "small wins" on cantonal level. In the Macedonian case there are strong indications that vivid policy outcomes are emerging.
In order to sketch the two causal mechanisms, we needed to assess each possible angle of the policy making process, but also to shed light on the claims of the movements in order to measure the similarities/differences between the expectations of the challengers and the political epilogue. These processes can be most fruitfully analyzed through in-depth interviews, coding of newspaper articles, and analysis of the policy documents together with the minutes of the sessions at which they were formally adopted. The interviews were conducted face to face, with four categories of interviewees. Each of them provided specific information regarding certain components of the causal chains. The first category of interviewees are the movement activists which took direct part in the protests that channeled the main claims of the governmental challengers. Regarding the sampling, we tended each interviewee from this category to come from a different sub-group of the movements: NGO members, human rights advocates, "usual suspects" as well as party affiliated individuals. They shared their views regarding the central claims, and to what extent these claims were covered by the final documents. They assess the discrepancy between their "wishful thinking" and reality. The second category of interviewees are the social movement organization (SMO) representatives, whose organizations participated both in the protest, but also in the framing of the policy proposals, as well as the political "Przhino Agreement" 1 in the Macedonian case. Regarding this category, we also sampled different organizations from different strands of the movement. The role of these interviewees was one of the crucial. The SMO representatives covered just one perspective of the narrative. The inside insights, referring to the policy process from within the institutions, was presented by the policy makers, in this case, members of the Macedonian parliament and the Federal parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The biggest four political parties, two in government and two in opposition (VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization -Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia), DUI (Democratic Union for Integration), DPA (Democratic Party of the Albanians)) were contacted in Macedonia, and the four most relevant Bosnian parties (SDP (Social Democratic Party), SDA (Party for Democratic Action), SBB (Union for a Better Future) and DF (Democratic Front)). Unfortunately, only one party per country answered the interview invitations -SDSM in Macedonia and SDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The last category of interviewees are the key informants. This category is composed of people which have thorough knowledge of the Macedonian and Bosnian context, but not only regarding the movements, but also regarding the history of the democratization processes in the countries, as well as other factors which contributed towards the initiations of the movements.
All in-depth interviews were conducted following a specific methodology applied to social movement studies, especially regarding the interviews with the activists. The main dilemmas which usually arise during the preparation and effectuation of the interviews are: how many interviewees?; How to find the interviewees?; The process of recruitment of interviewees etc. (della Porta 2014, p.243). For this study, six (6) activists, six (6) SMO representatives, six (6) key informants and only two (1) policymakers were interviewed. Apart from the "policymakers" category, where we lack sufficient information from some political parties regarding the policy process, in the three other categories, we have sufficiently reached the needed level of data saturation.
Moving to the methodological approach, as previously mentioned, we are applying Process Tracing Methodology (PTM) as an overarching method which aims to reconstruct the causal mechanisms of the two movements. PTM is convenient because there are clear and straightforward outcomes, which have to be related to one or more causes, as well as to several explanatory factors. The main ambition of PTM is to trace causal mechanisms (see more Bennett 2008a , 2008b , Checkel 2008 , George and Bennet 2005 . Glennan defines a causal mechanism as "a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan 1996, p. 52). Developing the argument of causal mechanisms, Beach and Pedersen try to build on the argument by George and Bennett, framing PTM as "attempts to identify the intervening causal process -the causal chain and causal mechanism -between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett 2015, pp. 206-7 in Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 10) .
The Analysis -Tracing the Causal Mechanisms in the "Bosnian Spring" and the "Citizens for Macedonia" Movements
After the presentation of the theoretical framework and applied methodology, we move towards sketching the two mechanisms. Starting from the aforementioned definition of "mechanism" provided by Glennan, the task is to unpack the complex system which produces the outcome, and take a deeper look at the number of parts which comprise the mechanism, as well as their interaction.
In order not to lose focus from the main research question, let us once again state what precisely we look at. The main idea is to unravel the two causal mechanisms which drove forward the "Bosnian Spring" and the "Citizens for Macedonia" movements and track the policy outcomes, comparing them to the previous grievances put forward by the main social movement actors.
The point of departure in both cases are the social movement activists. They are the right people to talk to, both regarding the claims making and the repertoires of action. Asked about the claim-making process, the "Bosnian Spring" activists could not stop explaining the multiple claims they made during the several weeks of protest: "I personally archived, scanned and put into order all the individual claims which were addressed during the plena. In the end, we arrived at a number of 14.000…this is too much, simply too much" (IV 1 BiH, 2016). The former Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Nermin Nikšić, also confirmed the chaotic approach of the claimants: "…I invited them to talk to me and other government representatives. I asked them 'What do you want exactly?' 'We want you to resign?' 'I will resign, when I lose the elections!' I replied, I am not handing the power to 2000-3000 thugs from the street just because they want it. Furthermore, they asked for solving of issues which were already solved. For example, cutting some benefits for public officials, decrease of salaries of certain officials." (IV 2 BiH, 2016). On the other hand, another activist clearly illustrates the anti-governmental and anti-systemic claim which was present throughout the protests: "We didn't just want the government to resign, we wanted more! We wanted everything! We wanted everything from which we were deprived for years: proper salaries, benefits, good education system, reasonable healthcare…But most of all we wanted a systematic change, a profound change! We pushed for a system which would take care of the people, and not just those in power" (IV 3 BiH, 2016) . In the Macedonian case, the grievances were much more structured than those in Bosnia one year before. This is confirmed both from the activists themselves, but also by analysis of the official webpage of the platform, where the main requests were addressed: "Immediate formation of a caretaking government which will ensure the accuracy of the voter register; insurances for independence of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and neutralizing the strong government influence and control; appointment of an independent public prosecutor; and organization of fully free and democratic elections which will reflect the objective political will of the Macedonian citizens" (Citizens for Macedonia 2015, http://17maj.gragjanite.mk/ ). The Macedonian activists were very straightforward regarding the issues they pressed for: "All we want is a normal democratic state! We want free and fair elections, we want a democratic government, an independent public broadcasting service and an objective prosecutor who will deal with all crimes mentioned in the 'bombs' 2 " (IV 1 MKD, 2016).
The repertoires of action were more or less repetitive in the two movements: marches, occupations, blockages and rallies were part of the daily décor in the streets of both capitals -Sarajevo and Skopje. What distinguished the protests where the "plenums" in BiH, and the two-months long occupation of the streets in front of the government in Skopje. We must also point out the plenumization of Macedonian society which happened couple of months before the grand protest in May 2015, when a student plenum, a professor plenum, a parents plenum and many similar organizational forms were created. One of the Sarajevo activists emotionally recalls the plenum sessions which took place in the Skenderija hall in central Sarajevo: "The hall was full of people. Everyone could stand up, grab the microphone and start speaking. There were very nice, emotional and inspiring speeches, but there were also speeches that could tear your heart apart. From time to time it felt like you are participating in some type of collective therapy" (IV 3 BiH, 2016) . The Macedonian activists proudly recall the occupation in front of the government, as an outcry against the corrupt structures which had captured Macedonia: "The 'Freedom Camp was a wonderful experience. Full of citizen activists but also party activists. We learned from one another. We learned to understand our differences. There were daily debates, where everyone could take part; there were also humanitarian activities. Each night there was a DJ party where famous politicians and NGO representatives acted as DJs, bridging the gap between themselves and the ordinary citizens. Also there were marches/rallies at least couple of times per week. Sometimes important dates were symbolized" (IV 3 MKD, 2016) . Both the claims-making process and the repertoires of action are important parts of the mechanism. They play a significant role in articulation of the grievances of challengers.
The third important element is the "repression by state authorities". Here we can see a clear variation between the two cases. In the Bosnian case there was severe overt repression by the police authorities. One of the activists shares her dramatic story: "I could not believe my eyes. After of couple hours of deadlock between the protestors and the police authorities, the police started pushing protestors towards the channel of Miljatska. At a certain moment I started to hear screams coming from the activists. People started falling down in the channel. I am speaking about a height of approximately 4-5 meters. There were multiple injuries, it was terrible. This is when the mass responded by throwing stones at the police forces" (IV 1 BiH, 2016) . This is when the previously presented hypotheses by Opp and Roehl comes to life: State repression increases the costs of protests and discourages people from taking the streets. In the following days there were less and less people on the streets. The Macedonian case is a scholarly example for covert repression. Although there was no physical violence, communications were massively monitored and activists were constantly held in limbo: "If you ask me about physical repression -no, there was nothing. But you could feel that you are being watched. When coming back home from protests, when holding meetings regarding organization, even when meeting friends…and after the 'bombs', we were quite sure that our phones are tapped and that even our online communication is being monitored" (IV 3 MKD, 2016) . The peculiarities of the functioning of the surveillance system in Macedonia are very vividly described by a university professor and analyst, Sasho Ordanoski: "Each morning the chief of staff of Sasho Mijalkov 3 -Toni Jakimovski was bringing a summary of hot topics collected in the previous 24 hours directly to the desk of PM Gruevski. Later, he suggested Gruevski which issues and which people should be closely followed, and Gruevski would just issue the command" (IV 4 MKD, 2016) . Repression is definitely one of the key variables (factors) which drives the causal mechanism in a certain direction. This part of the mechanism is one of the two which makes a clear difference regarding the outcome. The other one are the allies and the opponents of the movements. They are explained in the following rows.
The friends and foes of social movements are the essence of the political opportunity structure (POS). Relationships with political parties, trade unions, media outlets and the international community, to a large extent shape the looks of the political outcomes of the movements. The "Bosnian Spring" was a scholarly example on "how not to" regarding relationships with other actors in the political system. The lack of cooperation and alliances were partly due to the will of the movement actors, but also partly because of the will of some foes. This is very lively pictured by one of the activists: "We didn't want to cooperate with any political party, not even with Naša Stranka 4 . When party representatives showed up at plenum sessions they were immediately expelled. On the other hand, all mainstream media aligned against us, depicting us as villains, thugs, drug users and criminals" (IV 2 BiH, 2016) . On the other hand, the Macedonian movement managed to create a serious portfolio of friends. Firstly, the platform itself was comprised of SMOs, political parties, individuals, but also media organizations. One of the platform coordinators explains the bridge building between the multiple actors: "We sat together and discussed for hours, for days…We created mixed commissions made by both NGO and political party representatives. When the political negotiations in Przhino took place, we communicated with the opposition party leaders as much as possible, trying to clarify our positions" (IV 5 MKD, 2016) .
The crucial part of the mechanisms are the (lack of) creation of the policy outputs leading towards policy outcomes. There were no better counterparts for conversation rather than the SMO representatives themselves. The SMO representatives from BiH are very persuasive when they comment on reaching the political arena: "The thousands of claims we had were not useful for formulating concrete policy proposals. Once or twice we managed to hand in some pieces of paper to the office of the PM, but those notes were chaotic and inconsistent. On the other hand, the lack of coalition with which ever political party made the task even harder. We didn't have anyone representing us on any of the many levels of government we have in Bosnia. It was so frustrating…" (IV 4 BiH, 2016) . One of the leaders of an organization which was a pillar of the Macedonian protest platform saw the policy making process as very participative, and also felt involved, to some extent, in the political negotiations: "We had regular meetings (as a citizens' block) with Zaev 5 , in order to consult regarding the central issues. When speaking about many issues agreed in Przhino, the citizens really felt like they have won. Here we mainly refer to the agreement regarding the technical (provisional) government, the resignation of former Prime Minister Gruevski, and the creation of the Special Prosecution Office" (IV 5 MKD, 2016) . He feels that the SMOs had a strong consultative role during the negotiation process: "During the political negotiations there were regular consultations between representatives of the SMOs and the political parties. We continuously advised the opposition what they can do, but also, what they shouldn't do under any means. As SMOs, we played an extremely large part in encouraging the opposition not to break under pressure that a political agreement must be reached" (Ibid 2016).
The absence of direct citizen's involvement has been spotted in both cases. Still unlike the BiH case where the challengers failed to reach the policy arena, the Macedonian parliament enacted a lot of laws directly alleviating the grievances of challengers. Bosnian federal MP and member of SDP Saša Magazinović spoke about the absence of documents proposed by the citizens during the political crisis: "I can only come to the conclusion that these people did not really know what they want. At a certain point I even felt that they are manipulated by foreign centers of power. During that contentious month, there was no single case that a draft law proposed by citizens or NGOs arrived at my table. In my opinion, the protests as a whole brought nothing good for BiH. On the contrary, they just stopped some euro integrative processes and postponed crucial reforms" (IV 5 BiH, 2016) . Regarding the insights coming from the Macedonian parliament, we present the views shared by former MP Sofija Kunovska coming from the opposition. She noted the velocity of the process, as well as the marginal influence of the citizens: "It is not a secret that the process was conducted by the four main political parties, brokered by the US and the EU. Unfortunately, the parliament failed to play the role that it was supposed to. As previously in multiple occasions, the parliament was just used as a notaria to verify previously agreed issues, without any real substantial debate. All issues were previously defined. We had a possibility to debate within the party, but this debate was also short due to the lack of time and numerous deadlines. That is why I think that the Przhino Agreement did not encompass all needed issues, and although it might sound rude, I would say that it is a "dead letter"…" (IV 6 MKD, 2016) . She also confirms the absence of whatever CSO, or any individual who gave an input during the committee sessions or the plenaries: "No, no…as far as I know not. There were no representatives neither from the SMOs, nor individuals. Even for us there was no sufficient time to discuss. There was a political agreement that there is a crisis in the state which does not do anyone good. There was no larger and broader debate. What was agreed by the leaders in Przhino was later transcribed into the laws." (Ibid 2016).
6
Emerging clearly from the interviews that the SMOs and the citizens played a minor role in the creation of the legislation, we come to the focal point where we should, at least to a certain extent, provide an answer to the question "Who really did exert the sufficient pressure and influence in order for the policy output to occur?" Previously it was mentioned that the main political parties played a strong role in the creation of the policy outputs, but they are clearly not the crucial factors. If the crisis was to be resolved solely by the parties, it is fair to say that no progress would have been made. This is primarily due to the autocratic rule of the VMRO-DPMNE regime, headed by former PM Gruevski. In the current democratic setting, with clearly non-functional and corrupt institutions, it is hard to believe that the four political leaders would have sealed the Przhino Agreement alone. The answer to the question is provided by other two key informants. One is the former president and PM of Macedonia, Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, while the other is an official working for the US Department of State.
President Crvenkovski has been a PM for eight years, and he also served additional five years as president of the Republic of Macedonia. He was also a president of SDSM for over fifteen years. Speaking about the processes is Przhino, he highlighted the following key points: "I am very skeptical that the negotiators in Przhino really took into consideration what the citizens would say. I am saying this primarily because of the character of the negotiations. They were conducted in a very discrete and hidden manner, I would even say in a too pragmatic manner. I think that the international factor played a crucial role in this process. Additionally, I think that this agreement has a lot of anomalies which are already showing their face." (IV 7 MKD, 2016) . Highlighting the international factor is of crucial importance. For one who is familiar with the political developments in the region, it is not a novelty that the international community has been ever-present whenever a political conflict arose. Nothing was different during the political crisis in Macedonia. Both the US and the EU played a vital part in brokering the political negotiations.
To use the words of the last interviewee: "The international community interfered and will always intervene in the sense of trying to 'level the field of play' regarding the electoral conditions." (IV 8 MKD, 2016) .
Conclusive Remarks
In the previous rows we tried, to the best of our knowledge and competencies, to shed light on two processes which to a certain extent shaped the recent history of two countries in the region -Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The two movements, the "Bosnian Spring" and the "Citizens for Macedonia", although very similar, had a very different political outcome. While in Macedonia some processes are still ongoing and open-ended, showing signs of clear impact by the movement, the Bosnian case brought nothing but couple of "small wins" on cantonal level. But to what extent do the causal mechanisms differ?
In the Bosnian case the mechanism was triggered by the shallow democratization of the country, and the claims-making of the movement, together with all repertoires of action performed by movement members, managed to activate the causal chain. Still, the hard and overt police repression, together with the lack of friends and allies in the wider political system, broke the chain and disabled governmental challengers to reach the policy arena and push for some normative and substantial changes. Additionally, the distancing of the international community did not ease the situation at all. On the contrary.
The Macedonian case evolved in a very different manner. Although the triggering factors and the behavior of movement activists was almost identical to the one in BiH, the weak response by the state, facilitated with multiple alliances created in the political system -mainly the partnership with political parties in opposition and some critical online media outlets, opened space for the movement to open the political opportunities and reach the policy arena. As presented, the final imprint of the political "Przhino Agreement" was shaped and nuanced by the international community -primarily the US ambassador and the representative of the EU in the Republic Macedonia.
Although not completely in line with the grievances put forward by the movement representatives, the laws resulting from the political agreement to a large extent satisfy the requests of the citizens. The creation of the Special Prosecutor's Office, together with the Law on Whistleblowers and multiple laws reshaping the form of government, open space for grievances to be substantially alleviated by the political system. The vivid political outcomes in the case of the Republic of Macedonia can already be felt through the work of the Special Prosecutor's Office, the implemented reforms in the electoral and the media spheres, as well as the new configuration of political power following the recently held early parliamentary elections in December 2016.
